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We discuss a simple model of choices of joint consumption by a working couple who place 
maintenance of their marriage (relationship) above all else. Any proposal made by one partner 
seeking to provide maximal utility to the other so as to preserve the marriage, in the case 
where preferences of partners are unknown, will be accepted. In this sense consumption is 
arbitrary. In a concluding section we suggest that while overly simple; this structure may 
characterize to some degree significant amounts of observed consumption, emphasing how 
social arrangements and the value placed on them by individuals can impact on observed 
economic behaviour. 
JEL Code: A10, A12, A13, C50, D01. 






Department of Economics 




Department of Finance 








February 11, 2009 
We acknowledge helpful comments by John Piggott, Ray Riezman, Hui Huang and Edgar 
Cudmore. We acknowledge the financial support from National Social Science Foundation of 
China (SSFC Grant 07AJL002) and “Humanities and Social Science” Major Projects, Chinese 
Ministry of Education (Grant Number 07JJD790145). 1 Introduction
Economists have paid relatively little attention to the inﬂuence that social value systems can
have both on economic behaviour, and our interpretations of observed behaviour for economic
policy. This is despite claims from authors in other disciplines that such analyses can have
fundamental implications both for behaviour itself and the way economic policy is formulated
conditional upon such interpretations. Examples are Sahlins (1972) whose uses anthropological
investigations of pre-industrial societies to suggest that even in modern day societies much
consumption activity is symbolic rather than for use, and Titmus (1970) whose analysis of
blood donation is used to suggest that economies based on gift relationships with no prices or
markets are more eﬃcient than conventional market based economies.
Formalizations of models of wider social interaction incorporating economic behaviour, such
as those by Hormats (1950) and Simon (1952), generally focus on ways in which social arrange-
ments lead to systems of norms and values in the tradition of Parsons (1932). These are
presented in a mathematically formalized setting familiar to economists, rather than in the nu-
anced verbal discussion common in much sociology literature but do not investigate how social
structures condition economic behaviour. Granovetter (1977) also provides a discussion of how
economic behaviour and social value systems interact, but again does not provide comparative
static results with associated policy implications.
Here, we discuss a speciﬁc form of a socially encased model of an economy which is pur-
posefully constructed to yield strong and stark results. In it we assume a population of happily
married couples whose dominant interest in life is maintaining their marriages. Individual mem-
bers of these unions engage in two activities, working and visiting shopping malls where all their
combined income in each period is fully spent. Members of the union only know their own util-
ity functions over goods, and have no information on the utility function of their partner. On
visiting the shopping mall, both partners can make a proposal as to their joint consumption and
they are motivated by the prospective enjoyment of their partner. Thus, if the proposal is that
they both buy, say, running shoes when they never go running the other partner immediately
accepts. In this sense, consumption in this economy is arbitrary even though each individual
has a utility function over goods and behaviour is optimizing, since preservation of the social
relationship (marriage) lexicographically dominates utility form consumption of goods.
In what follows, we ﬁrst present a simple formalization of a model embodying this idea and
demonstrate that the solution concept implies arbitrary consumption. We also suggest that,
2while behaviour in reality is much more complex, this form of consumption may be seen in
practice in consumption expenditures on Christmas and other gifts, expenditures on items such
as food and clothing for other family members, and other socially encased economic behaviour.
We also draw out some policy implications of the model, including the absence of any dead
weight costs of taxation and the seemingly large potential welfare beneﬁts (in a consumption
sense) of divorce. In a ﬁnal section, we speculate on some possible elaborations of the model
to include sequential learning of preferences of partners both in an overlapping generations
structure and in inﬁnitely lived consumer recursive dynamics.
2 A Marriage-Shopping Mall Model
We consider a world where there are 2N individuals. At the beginning of the period they
are all in marriages, and their primary objective is to remain in their union at the end of the
period. Unions involve N pairs of individuals which we index j = 1,2. We assume that while
members of such unions are oppositely sexed, the objective of procreation does not enter either
preferences or strategic behaviour. Their strategy for remaining in their chosen union is simply
to maximize their partner’s utility from goods consumption in the hope that higher goods utility
will raise the chance of the marriage surviving, and they also minimize conﬂict by agreeing to
whatever their partner proposes.
Individuals in each union are assumed to consume goods X
nj
l , where l = 1,··· ,L denotes
each of L commodities, n denotes the union (n = 1,··· ,N), and j denotes the individual
(j = 1,2). We assume each member of the union works in period t and receives income Inj (we
suppress the subscript for simplicity). Work decisions are exogenous. The union income in the
period in this is given by
P2
j=1 Inj.
We assume each individual in each union has a utility function from goods consumption
which we write as
Unj(Xnj), (2.1)




L ). All consumption expenditures are decided upon
jointly by couples in a single visit to the shopping mall made each period. Individual members
of the union are allowed to make proposals to the other member of the union as to how they
should jointly allocate their income to the expenditure of goods. The only restriction is that
the union budget constraint be satisﬁed.











For simplicity, we assume that all consumption proposals made involve joint and identical




Thus proposals are made that each partner jointly consume, say, an apple or a pear. This
restriction can be relaxed.
Each union member is assumed to have a preference ordering over both utility from goods
consumption and preservation of their marriage which is lexicographic in marriage preservation.
They also believe that a partner receiving higher utility from goods consumption is more likely
to remain in the marriage. They therefore seek to minimize conﬂict between union members
so as to preserve marital bliss, and their objective of providing maximal utility from goods
consumption for the other union member they meet by guessing at their preferred consumption.
In the absence of any information as to the preferences of the partner any proposal of the form
(2.3) consistent with (2.2) will be immediately accepted by the other union member.
We denote Mnj to be the marriage of pair n that individual j attempts to preserve. The
preference ordering of individual i in pair n is V nj(Mnj,Unj(Xnj)) for j = 1,2. We assume
that the preference ordering V nj is lexicographic and Mnj dominates Unj(Xnj). Individual
j = 1,2 also believes that, the larger Un,3−j(Xn,3−j), the higher Mnj. Thus we can write the
lexicographic preference ordering for all individuals as 1
V nj(Un,3−j(Xn,3−j),Unj(Xnj)), n = 1,··· ,N; j = 1,2. (2.4)
We assume that neither partner knows the utility function over goods of the other partner.
Thus, for j = 1,2, individual j does not know Un,3−j(Xn,3−j). Thus if partner j has a diﬀuse
prior (or a uniform prior) on Un,3−j(Xn,3−j) or Unj(Xnj), they make random proposals for
consumption, and the other partner accepts. Thus, each individual j in union n faces the
following utility maximization problem












1This lexicographic preference ordering is not, however, continuous.
4which gives the diﬀuse prior on V nj implies that individual makes a random proposal for
consumption.
In this sense, therefore, consumption behaviour in this economy is arbitrary. Any proposal
for joint and similar consumption behaviour by each couple is accepted both members, indepen-
dently of their own preferences. In this economy, economic behaviour can seem irrational but
is sustained by socially encased optimizing behaviour of individuals where persuit of marriage
preserving objectives dominates individual beneﬁts from the use of commodities.
Two implications which follow from this model are that the dead weight loss of taxation will
be zero, and that potentially signiﬁcant consumption (or goods) welfare gains will accrue from
divorce. This follows because consumption activity in the presence of taxation (assuming that
revenues from commodity speciﬁc taxes are returned in lump sum form to consumers) remains
the same. With consumption proposals and their joint acceptance, provided the union holds,
the welfare from remaining married is unaﬀected by taxes. Equally, the utility consumption
gains from divorce (ignoring the loss from marriage break down) could potentially be large in
this structure since separate consumption decision would involve individual budget constraints,
and individually based utility maximization of goods consumed.
3 Empirical Implications and Possible Model Extensions
While extremely simple, this model seemingly has disturbing empirical implications. How
much consumption behaviour in practice is of the type suggested here is unknown from available
data, since consumer survey data only reports consumption expenditure by category (eg. food,
clothing), not by purchaser (individual or couple). But much consumption would seem to be
undertaken by individual family members on behalf of other family members. This includes
Christmas gift expenditures (sometimes put at 25 % of annual expenditures on durables, see
Waldfogel (1997)), other gifts, expenditures on food, clothing, holidays, cars and many other
items. Socially encased consumption is not a concept ﬁnding empirical analogues in national
income accounts and other data sources, but perhaps it should.
This simple model is also stark and deliberately so, so as to forcefully show its conclusions
and implications, and models with sequential learning and preference revelation would seemingly
weaken its force. And it would seem an over simpliﬁcation to suggest that couples can live
together for, say, 40 years without gaining at least some knowledge of each other’s likes and
dislikes. Equally, parents’ imputations of preferences of children are likely follow a related
5sequence of discovery (and change). Thus model extensions to incorporate an overlapping
generations structure where over time newly married couples discover more of each others likes
and dislikes would seem a natural weakening extension. And equally similar weaker conclusions
would likely follow from an inﬁnitely lived couples (and individuals) modeling approach with
recursive dynamics.
Whether social arrangements diﬀer enough from society to society that diﬀerent models of
encasement make more sense for diﬀerent economies is left as an open issue. Do, say, Chinese
marriages diﬀer enough from American marriages that distinctive forms of social encasement,
and hence societal speciﬁc representations, are appropriate. To the extent that societies are
distinct, economists might thus be well advised to move away from completely general models
claiming to represent all societies and perhaps to groupings of social structures (traditional
/ non-traditional or Asia / non-Asia, for instance), or even to more speciﬁc representations
(Thailand, Argentina, New York or Manhattan, for instance).
Social encasement of economic behaviour seems clearly important comparing, says, Chinese
to OECD behaviour where collective identity to family, village, town, province, and China
seemingly drive acceptance of responsibility by individual Chinese, and result in much hard
work and creative energy. Indeed, an extreme characterization of the Chinese economy might
be as joint collective commitment not to repeat the political and social instability which has
characterized Chinese history for 10,000 years, or longer. Growth though hard work is the
modern Chinese collective response to hopefully ensuring an absence of social meltdown. As
such high growth in modern China may reﬂect collective commitment with the resulting social
encasement heavily determining individual economic behaviour.
The theme of this short paper, then, is that socially encased economic behaviour if explicitly
modeled may lead to sharply diﬀerent interpretations of that behaviour economists are used to.
Literature on such social encasement seems sparse and little developed. Extensions of the form
and type of economies would seem productive for richer and deeper analytics to follow.
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